Do Demographics Dictate Military Strategy?

Demography may not be destiny, but it does provide a reasonably clear lens thorough which we can perceive the features of tomorrow’s security environment. For strategists interested in shaping and responding to the future, no field provides such a solid basis for projection as demography. Today’s population trends—unless altered by some catastrophe—will have foreseeable consequences over the next quarter century.

Having said that, the world today confronts circumstances that are without historical precedent. Throughout history, the combination of high birthrates and low life expectancy ensured predominantly young populations, with few surviving to old age. Today, however, declining birthrates and improvements in medical care are shifting the demographic landscape—so too are evolving patterns of migration. These trends collectively suggest that some countries will be far better positioned to weather the coming demographic storm than others. One of these is the United States, whose situation is a source of enduring strategic advantage. Militarily, however, the United States will face the challenge of having to do more international heavy lifting with fewer resources.

During the next 25 years, population growth in much of the developed world will slow or decline. A quarter century from now, there will be 63 elderly Japanese and 59 elderly Europeans for every 100 workers. Even China will see its ratio of elderly to working population double as the result of lower birthrates, better diet and improved medical care. The aging of the developed world may make it less likely that governments in Europe and Asia will be willing to use military force absent an overwhelming threat.

Changing Demographics Worldwide

Russia’s demographic future is perhaps the starkest. The nation’s population is declining by 0.5 percent annually and, given Russian health and welfare profiles, there is every prospect that decline will continue, barring a drastic shift in social attitudes or public policy. Because of alcohol and drug abuse and poor medical care, the current generation of Russians will live shorter lives than their parents.

Russia’s leadership recognizes demography as a national security concern, one that could manifest itself in a number of ways. For example, Russia’s depopulation of Siberia—and in particular the Far East—will likely affect its relations with China. Although the Russian Far East consists of approximately one-third of the Russian Federation’s territory, it holds only 5 percent of its population. The settlement of Chinese migrants, a massive population imbalance across the border and Chinese military modernization all threaten the Russian identity in the Far East.

Russia’s demographic decline is one of several trends that have led Moscow to turn increasingly to nuclear weapons. Today the Russian armed forces contemplate nuclear use not only in retaliation against a nuclear attack but also on the battlefield. In the future, a weak Russia might engage actively in nuclear coercion as a way of magnifying its influence.

Europe faces a similar, though less dramatic, demographic situation. European nations stopped replacing their losses to deaths in 2007, and despite pronatalist policies, their populations are unlikely to increase significantly over the next quarter century. The cost of paying for social programs has already put pressure on European defense spending; that cost will only grow over time. As a result, there is reason to question whether Europeans will be willing to bear the cost of military operations—particularly those outside Europe. The changing composition of European societies, including growing numbers of Muslim immigrants, might further influence European attitudes regarding the use of force.

Japan’s population will fall from 128 million to approximately 117 million in the 2030s, mainly due to the collapse of its birthrate. Whereas Tokyo has sought to counteract this trend through medical advances and investment in robotics, it is unclear how this will play out over time. In one possible scenario, Japan could become increasingly insecure in a fractious Asian security environment characterized by the rise of China.

Over the next quarter century, China’s population will grow by 170 million, but its population will age considerably because of the Chinese government’s one-child policy. The fact that many families favor male children has led to a considerable imbalance between young males and females. How that imbalance will affect China’s external and internal policies is impossible to predict. Some, for example, have argued that a bulge of young, unmarried males could lead to increasing Chinese aggressiveness. We have already seen displays of nationalist exuberance among Chinese youth in response to China’s behavior in Tibet.

Positive U.S. Demographic Outlook

In contrast to much of the rest of the developed world, the United States faces a promising demographic future. Over the next quarter century, the U.S. population will increase by more than 50 million to a total of approximately 355 million. This growth will result not only from births in current American families but also from continued immigration, particularly from Mexico and the Caribbean.

Such immigration could prove to be an enduring source of U.S. strategic advantage. How effective the United States proves in assimilating these new immigrants into the life of the nation will play a major role in determining its strategic effectiveness. The United States’ historical ability to assimilate has given it a distinct advantage over most other nations, which display little willingness to incorporate immigrants into the mainstream of their societies.

Whereas the developed world will experience a demographic decline, many states in the developing world are facing a “youth bulge.” Ninety-five percent of the increase in the world’s population over the next quarter century will occur in developing countries. This population growth—combined with poor governance and economic performance—is likely to exacerbate tensions in the developing world.

Although population growth across the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa has recently begun to abate, in coming years youth will account for more than half the population of much of the region. Moreover, poor governance in many states raises the very real prospect of the failure of economic growth to keep pace with population growth. Where economic growth creates unmet expectations, the potential for revolution and war will be considerable. As a result, in the future the U.S. armed forces might be called on to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in regions characterized by abject poverty. Indeed, the demand for intervention in the developing world is likely to rise just as many developed states’ capacity to intervene declines.

Demographic trends could have three major implications for the U.S. national security in coming decades.

First, absent some major unforeseen shock, America’s demographic position will be a source of long-term strategic strength. To exploit that strength, the United States will need to do more to craft public policy that encourages legal immigration and to develop public policy approaches to ensure that immigrants are assimilated into American society.

Second, the fact that the United States’ traditional allies are all facing aging populations is likely to make it even harder for the United States to garner material support for its efforts. The limits to European military capability are painfully obvious in Afghanistan, and Japan’s out-of-area military efforts have stalled. In retrospect, we might look back on Afghanistan as representing the high-water mark of those allies’ willingness and ability to project power beyond their borders.  Even in defense of their own territory, advanced states might face real limits. The decline in South Korea’s birthrate has already shaped the imperative to transform the Republic of Korea Armed Forces into a smaller but more professional military.

Third, although the burden of paying for an aging population will be less for the United States than for many of its allies, the cost will nonetheless be substantial. The United States possesses the finest military in the world, but also one of the most expensive. As the congressionally mandated Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel recently reported, pay and benefits (including health care and retirement) for each member of the U.S. armed forces currently cost more than $400,000. Unless something is done to reduce manpower costs, defense spending will soon come into direct conflict with social spending—and that is a conflict the military might not be able to win.